Abstract This paper examines the intellectual impact of Ayotallah Muhamad Hussein Fadlallah (1935Fadlallah ( -2010) on Hizbullah's political behaviour. Many depicted Fadlallah as the 'spiritual guide' and 'oracle' of Hizbullah, while others accentuated his socio-political independence and the potential he represented as an 'alternative' to Hizbullah and Iran. This study argues that Fadlallah directly influenced Hizbullah's political worldviews, but the Islamic movement's socialisation in Lebanon, its dependence on Iran, and its war with Israel have led it to pursue a separate path from Fadlallah. But despite the separation, the Ayatollah shared a common world vision with Hizbullah and the Islamic Republic, and would not have formed an alternative. The paper divides into two sections. The first examines the socio-political origins of Fadlallah and Hizbullah as an intellectual and a political movement, respectively, and conceptualises the discursive and political fields that motivate the behaviour of the two actors. The second section assesses the impact of Fadlallah's ideas on Hizbullah by focusing on three main themes: (a) Islamic liberation and resistance against injustice; (b) the Islamic state and Lebanon; and (c) Wilayat al-Fakih and Islamic Iran.
Introduction
The intellectual work of Ayatollah Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah (1935 Fadlallah ( -2010 , the Lebanese Islamic-Shi'a marja'a (religious source of emulation), has shaped the political paths of Islamist revolutionaries, especially the Islamist Lebanese movement, Hizbullah.
The politico-religious reformer, however, remained 'above politics'; he neither joined a 1 I thank Hussein Abdulsater, Ewan Stein, and an anonymous reviewer for their useful comments and suggestions on previous versions of this article. All the paper's shortcomings remain mine alone. 
Parallel Paths: Origins of an intellectual and a political movement
As social actors, Fadlallah and Hizbullah are, among other things, the products of a Shi'iIslamic 'cultural environment' 10 : this environment transcends state boundaries, and him a year later as a 'father, teacher, and educator', for the eulogy, see http://www.yahosein.com/vb/showthread.php?t=155619, accessed on 13 July 2013. 10 I take a cultural environment to mean 'the socially and culturally available array of symbols and meaning from which [social] movements can draw'. For a discussion, see Rhys interlocks Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, and to a lesser degrees other states of the Middle East.
Intellectual and political developments in any of these countries have had direct or indirect effects on others. 11 In this section, I examine the socio-political origins of both actors with the aim of demarcating the fields in which each actor operates and the functions they perform for the Shi'a social movement, specifically in Lebanon.
The socio-political origins of Fadlallah and Hizbullah can be attributed to an Islamic-Shi'a revivalism in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. This religio-political revival was made possible with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the emergence of states, where Shi'a formed significant communities. 12 There are three prominent processes, however, that have contributed to the rise of the Lebanese Shi'a social movement of which Fadlallah and Hizbullah became central actors. 13 The first originates 
Fadlallah: A sociology of an Islamic intellectual
Intellectuals are at the heart of contentious politics. 16 As producers of knowledge and meaning, and as representatives of popular interests, 17 they aspire either to transform or preserve certain values or political configurations in society. They engage in intellectual battles within discursive fields: 'such fields emerge or evolve in the course of discussion of and debate about contested issues and events'. 18 Intellectuals generate what Max Weber calls 'world images', or what students of social movements define as framing: intellectuals 'assign meaning to and interpret relevant events and conditions in ways that are intended to mobilize potential adherents and constituents, to garner bystander support, and to demobilize antagonists'. 19 Fadlallah was such an intellectual in the Shi'i-Islamic discursive field and social movement. Born to Lebanese parents in the Shi'i holy city of Najaf, he followed his family's tradition of pursuing religious studies. Studying in Najaf, the world's renowned centre of Shi'i religious learning, provided the young Fadlallah with a gate into the Shi'i discursive field. Although the focus in Najaf was on religious studies, this was not isolated from the sociopolitical changes that had engulfed Iraq and the broader Middle East. Early on Fadlallah showed signs of being a rebel. His passion for poetry stood against the religiously conservative Najafi scholars and his own urge to continue his studies. The ideological dominance of Communist and Arab Nationalist secular thought 15 be 'independent and comprehensive in advancing their ideas'. This is important for the 'authenticity' of their message and for their own 'confidence'. For Fadlallah, research on power is not a mere intellectual exercise; it is rather 'connected to Muslims' fateful social, political and military causes'. 23 We will see in the following section how this had a direct effect on Hizbullah's world vision.
Fadlallah was not only carving an Islamic intellectual sphere, but was also locating himself as a relatively autonomous intellectual. He certainly was not the 'classbounded' organic intellectual, which Gramsci theorised about. On the other hand, he was not part of an intellectual 'class' that was immune to and isolated from socio-political concerns and activism. 24 Fadlallah was, rather, a bounded intellectual, and he was bounded in two ways. Firstly, in his intellectual processes-the development of his ideas, interpretations, concepts, political frames, and perceptions-he was bounded by a pre-existing religious system: Islam, which is conveyed by the Holy Qur'an and the 24 In the sociology of intellectuals there are three categories: a class-bound or organic intellectual, which is tied to, and speaks on behalf of, a social class according to the Gramscian perspective; a class-less, Karl Mannehiem and Max Weber's idea that intellectuals are neither attached to social classes nor are they a class in their own; but rather intellectuals are a relatively autonomous; and finally the approach that believes that intellectual constitute a class of their own that seeks to present the interests of society as a whole. For a discussion see, Charles Kurzman and Lynn Owens, 'The Sociology of Intellectuals', Annual Review of Sociology, 28 (August 2002), pp. 63-90. 25 As Weber observes, it is not 'that the specific nature of religion is simple 'function' of the social situation of the stratum which appears as its characteristic bearer'. Rather, despite the socio-political influences, any religious reinterpretation has origins in religious sources; 'such reinterpretations adjust the revelations to the needs of the religious community', see Weber, From Max Weber, pp. 269-270. social movement, which required intellectual answers that, in Fadlallah's case, meant a reinterpretation of existing religious norms and traditions. 26 Here one does not fail to notice two ostensibly conflicting, but actually consistent, drives in Fadlallah's intellectual and political development. On the one hand, Fadlallah is like the Weberian, relatively autonomous, intellectual who strives to transcend political dynamics; a missionary and a universalist who encourages mutual tolerance among competing views. Fadlallah's was an Islamist mission. He strove to present Islam as an alternative to modern ideologies, but also wanted to reach, through Islam, to the universal. As such he sought to remain immune from the impurities of the political field, which involved power struggles, compromises, and pragmatism. This mission must have been influenced by his education at Najaf, which fosters the marja'a as a figure that is above politics. 27 But Fadlallah could afford to maintain a level of relative autonomy from political forces and the state thanks to his socio-economic independence. In 1976 he became the Wakil [representative] for Abul Qasim Al-Kho'ei in Lebanon, which did not only mean that he could 'disseminate his juridical rulings and opinions', but could also 'collect religious taxes (zakat and khums) and donations', giving him the financial means to establish a network of religious and social services. 28 The second drive is Fadlallah's attachment to socio-political activism and, hence, his direct influence on the political field. His universalist intellectual mission was not a mere philosophy, ambition, or a religious 'call'. Rather, he viewed the Islamist intellectual intervention as a form of Jihad, which in Fadlallah's understanding involves both 'intellect and practice'. 29 As Abu-Rabi argues, 'Fadlallah does not look at ilm [religious knowledge] as an isolated sanctuary, and the ulama are not its isolated 26 'While seekers of pure knowledge have a "calling" to pursue the truth', argues Sadri, 'intellectuals are committed to a "mission" to the masses', Ahmad Sadri, Max Weber's Sociology of Intellectuals (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992) pp. 108-111. 27 As Sankari observes: 'It was anathema to the majority of Shi'i mujtahids to establish or join modern political parties with their separate structural organization, distinct mode of activity and partisan loyalty', it was 'a serious departure from the traditional mujtahid-laymen network, and undermined the undisputed authority of the grand juriconults'. Sankari, Fadlallah, p. 71, 76. Qassem reiterates this point about Shamseddine, who always stressed that his is at 'one distance from all [political] factions', p. 21. 28 Sankari, Fadlallah, p. 161. 29 Fadlallah, al-Islam, p.13. priests'. His political thought is directly connected to harakiya, or religo-political activism, where both political movements and proselytisers have a duty to fulfil the aims of Islamic Dawa, or mission. 30 These two drives place Fadlallah at the intersection of the discursive and political fields, which can explain the opacity of his socio-political role and relationship to Hizbullah.
Hizbullah and the political field
Hizbullah, on the other hand, belonged to the political field. Its behaviour is shaped by the ideals and world images it carries from the Shi'a Islamist discursive field and, crucially for a political force, by the material balance of power. The political field is where ideals and world images transform into organised political power, namely into political ideologies, programs, and strategies. It is within the political field that cultural and religious elements are politicised by actors (parties, leaders, regimes). This transformation does not only reshape ideas, but also conditions the behaviour of a political actor. 31 Hizbullah is one example. 33 Qassem adds that these groups invited Fadlallah to play a central role in the nascent party, but he refused Ibid., p.22 becoming instruments for the achievement of specific political goals. Hizbullah's 'Open Letter', its manifesto of 1985, is an illustration of this transformation: it carved the Islamist group's sphere in Lebanese and regional political fields. The manifesto defined the organisation's political identity and program, demarcating friends, allies and enemies, of which it identified the US, Israel, and their domestic allies as its the most significant. 34 The Lebanese-born organisation emphasised its Islamic, globalist identity and loyalty to 'the orders, of a single, wise and just authority currently represented in the supreme Ayatollah Ruhollah al-Musawi al-Khomeini'. In so doing it differentiated itself from its Shi'a competitor, Amal. 35 As we shall see in the next section, it identified the Islamic system as its main goal, on condition that the 'majority' of the Lebanese accepts it.
The world images, which were generated in the Shi'i-Islamic discursive field by . 36 As Sadri argues, the 'intelligentsia will be found more willing than intellectuals to view ideas instrumentally'. The intelligentsia 'consume' and 'disseminate' ideas, but they do Instead of getting drawn into dreams and wishes… we should seek to buttress our common characteristics at a practical level that would lead to unity in its different cultural or political or jihadist facets… [we need] not be drawn into a discussion about the sex of angels when our land is occupied and when the arrogant imperialist powers threaten our future. 37 By establishing several new hawzas (religious seminaries), Hizbullah revolutionised the role of religious schools (which in Qassem's view did not offer the conditions of a political revival as they did in Iran 38 ). The aim, as Abisaab observes, was 'to nurture the 'intellectual' as someone organically tied to the depressed Shi'i classes, and to spread the ideas of the party as effectively as possible'. These hawzas indoctrinate students with Khomeini's ideology, students who then go on to play an important role in disseminating Hizbullah's ideology as religious teachers, mosque leaders, proselytisers and politicians. 39 Hizbullah's religio-political need to advance its own, Khomeinist, world vision reflects the presence of other competing sites in the political and discursive fields of the Shi'i social movement. 40 This is also true of Ashura, (the annual commemoration of the Martyrdom of Hussein, the grandson of the Prophet) which Hizbullah's frames in ways that are conducive to its political strategy. 41 so for specific goals; they act as mediators between intellectuals and other social forces, Sadri, Max Weber's, pp. 69-70. Hizbullah's intelligentsia includes, but is not limited to, religious leaders of Hizbullah-controlled Hawzas, presidents of religious and political studies centres (such as Sheikh Shafeek Jradi and Hassan Hoballah, respectively), Hizbullah officials (Sheikh Naim Qassem, Nawaf Moussawi, Hassan Fadlallah, and Ali Fayad), and Hizbullah sympathisers (Qassem Qassir, Ahmad Majid, Tallal Atrissi). 37 Qassem, Hizbullah, pp.42-3. 38 Qassem, Hizbullah, p.24. 39 Rula Jurdi Abisaab, 'The Cleric as Organic Intellectual: Revolutionary Shi'ism in the Lebanese Hawzas', in H.E. Chehabi (ed) Distant Relations: Iran and Lebanon in the last 500 years (London and New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 2006), p. 241. Abisaab adds that Hizbullah 'brought more structure, discipline, and hierarchy to the hawzas with the aim of controlling who rise to the top on the basis of social demand and the overall benefit to Shi'a society', p. 250. 40 For example, Shamseddine believed that the religious seminaries should be politically neutral and refused the curricula of the Hizbullah controlled hawzas, see Ibid., p.252. 41 As Atrissi observes, Hizbullah's commemoration of Ashura 'reached high level of organisation to the extent that the movement has established schools to prepare Ashura reciters'; moreover, it holds conferences to discuss Ashura's potential for social, religious, and political mobilisation. See Talal then transforms into a practical application. 44 For Fadlallah, Muslims need to draw God back into their lives and to accept that God's guidance and support of their actions will lead to 'God's promise' of eventual 'victory' against injustice. 45 For him, this idea is also a means to enhance the confidence of the fighter: 'it is the practical tool in the Quran to amass the weak with power… by asking them to be self-reliant and dependent first and foremost on God'. 46 Hizbullah, as we shall see below, shares this perception: it frame its survival against Israel in the 2006 war as a 'Divine Victory' and as 'God's promise'.
Whilst cognizant of the spiritual dimensions (being dependent on God) of the resistance against injustice and oppression, Fadlallah is also aware of the material basis (being self-reliant) of the struggle. Here his realism and understanding of power invites the Islamist to be attentive to socio-political conditions, to be self-reliant, and to exercise restraint in the face of external pressure. He argues that Islam's quest for power has two main reasons: first, in order for the umma to achieve its goals, by being self-reliant and by controlling its own resources; and second, to deter war. This occurs when the umma is able to amass power that 'would deter and frighten the enemy'. In this regard, Fadllalah calls upon Muslims to be realistic in their approach and to not state or seek to achieve 'fictional goals'. 48 Self-reliance is crucial for an independent political actor; otherwise, reliance on powerful actors, such as the colonial powers or authoritarian regimes, transforms the Islamist into a tool in the power struggles of others. The Islamist needs, through a piecemeal approach, to accumulate power and 44 Ibid., p. 264. Fadlallah is famous for continuously reiterating the following Quranic verse, which relates to this idea: 'Lo! Allah changeth not the condition of a folk until they (first) change that which is in their hearts', The Glorious Quran, p. 321. 45 Fadlallah builds on verses, 5-6 in Surat Al-Kisas, 5-6 and 39-40 in Surat al-Haj in the Quran. 46 invest in existing economic, social and political potential to achieve independence. 49 Fadlallah believes that 'power is not about excitement and reaction'; rather, it is about the constant effort to achieve goals, through planning and practical training, and through the exercise of self-restraint against external pressure. A strong leader is one who is able to control their anger, and not lose control and initiative in battle. 50 Where should this power be directed? For Fadlallah, Islamic revival involves freedom from oppressive regimes and colonialism. This is a religious duty. Islam calls upon the Muslim to 'promote virtue and prevent vice', including the struggle against unjust and oppressive regimes that deviate from the mission of Islam. Political oppression against the weak and downtrodden, which takes place in the name of preserving stability and consolidating regime power, should be resisted.
The Islamic perception of the duties of the believer transcends his commitment to [the main pillars] of Sharia; rather, it also includes a commitment to participate in establishing justice and the resistance of oppression in the Umma, even if this involved the exercise of power in the process of change. 51 As we shall see in the next section, the approach-violent or political-applied to achieve this change depends on the objective socio-political conditions. But for the Islamic message and political project to be delivered in a useful manner, the Islamist actor needs to be 'wise', 72 which 'means pursuing a realist [also objective] approach that takes into consideration the existing mental, intellectual, 68 Fadlallah, Min ajl al-Islam, p. 188. 69 It is no coincidence that one of his biographers has portrayed him as a 'radical pragmatist', see Sankari, Fadlallah, p. 190 70 'It is known that the jihad in Mecca was one of dawa; the aim was to ingrain the main principles of the new religion…to save people from the ignorance that dominated them, and from the rigidity of the mind…a jihad, which God has considered to be the 'Grand that Christianity has no basis for a political system. 75 It is in the context of this phrase that Fadlallah believes in freedom of speech and ideological plurality. 76 Therefore, the socio-political conditions dictate the nature of the tools the Islamist should use to achieve their goals. As to when violence or politics can be used as tool, this should largely be based on objective socio-political conditions. 77 However, what happens when the Islamist state is established? For Fadlallah the emergence of a state necessitates its defence against its enemies. Once again, Fadlallah refers to the Prophet's experience in state making. For him, the migration from Mecca to Medina led to a qualitative change in Islam's existence, transforming it from a missionary campaign to a fixed entity with a material basis: a land, a people, and a government. Such an entity then required an army to defend it: for you cannot defend a state with ideas and da'wa. 78 Fadllallah does not provide a specific template for the fate of non-believers of Islam, but does theorise that such a state will not permit the 73 It is on these religious and historical bases that Fadlallah supports the theory of 94 The Open
Letter reveals the movement's undisputed commitment to Wilayat al-Faqih, embodied in Khomeini and Islamic Iran. 95 As with the establishment of an Islamic state, Hizbullah's commitment to Wilayat al-Faqih raised opposition among its Lebanese and Arab adversaries. Does Hizbullah abide by the guidance of the Faqih in Iran? Or is its behaviour shaped by Lebanese interests? Some scholars believe that Hizbullah has reinterpreted its commitment to the theory as a consequence of its political adaptation to the Lebanese socio-political context. 96 Others contend that Hizbullah's integration in Lebanon, and its so-called 'Lebanonisation', is a cover for its Islamist agenda in Lebanon and the region. 97 the Faqih, 98 for Qassem, the Faqih takes into consideration two factors in the application of his wilaya: first, the application of sharia; and second, the 'specific and objective circumstances of each community or country, which influences the nature of their commitment to the Fakih'. 99 In one response to his party's critics, Nasrallah has both reiterated his movement's commitment to the Faqih, but added a qualification:
In this study I examined the impact and limits of Fadlallah's ideas on Hizbullah and the relationship that governed the two actors. Three conclusions can be drawn from the analysis. Firstly, Fadlallah's politico-religious ideas, like Max Weber's 'switchmen', have conditioned the world images of Hizbullah, determining the political path Hizbullah initiated in the 1980s. But we also realise that Hizbullah's political socialisation in Lebanese and regional politics drives the Islamic movement on a separate path that is determined by the dynamic of interest.
Secondly, Hizbullah's political socialisation reveals that external pressure on a movement can reveal inconsistencies in its political ideals and invite it to reframe them. 
